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Notification of data breaches under the
continuous disclosure regime
Rouhshi Low,* Mark Burdon† and Paul von Nessen‡
Consumer personal information is now a valuable commodity for most
corporations. Concomitant with increased value is the expansion of new
legal obligations to protect personal information. Mandatory data breach
notification laws are an important new development in this regard. Such laws
require a corporation that has suffered a data breach, which involves
personal information, such as a computer hacking incident, to notify those
persons who may have been affected by the breach. Regulators may also
need to be notified. Australia currently does not have a mandatory data
breach notification law but this may be about to change. The Australian Law
Reform Commission has suggested that a data breach notification scheme
be implemented through the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth). However, the
notification of data breaches may already be required under the continuous
disclosure regime stipulated by the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the
Australian Stock Exchange (ASX) Listing Rules. Accordingly, this article
examines whether the notification of data breaches is a statutory
requirement of the existing continuous disclosure regime and whether the
ASX should therefore be notified of such incidents.
I Introduction
The increased collection of personal information for business purposes has
been a key requisite of e-commerce systems. Personal information is now a
valuable asset that is prized by both corporations and by identity theft
criminals. The acquisition of personal information by unauthorised third
parties has therefore taken on a much greater prominence including an
increased media and legal interest in the reporting of data breaches. Data
breaches involving the unauthorised disclosure of personal information can
take several forms.1 For example, computer hacking incidents that take
advantage of ineffective information security measures,2 the misappropriation
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1 See discussion at Part VB below for an overview of existing taxonomies.
2 See, eg, Federal Trade Commission, CardSystems Solutions Settles FTC Charges, Federal
Trade Commission, Washington DC, 2006, at <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/
02/cardsystems_r.htm> (accessed 23 April 2010); J Pereira, ‘Breaking The Code: How
Credit-Card Data Went Out Wireless Door — In Biggest Known Theft, Retailer’s Weak
Security Lost Millions of Numbers’, The Wall Street Journal, New York, 4 May 2007, A1.
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of personal information by employees,3 the theft of computer equipment or
storage media,4 the improper decommissioning of storage media5 or the
inadvertent publication of personal information.6 In total, over 341 million
records containing personal or sensitive person information have been
disclosed in the United States since 2005.7
US state-based legislatures have responded to these failures by developing
a new subset of law, data breach notification law, that encompasses elements
of privacy law, corporate governance and the newly burgeoning information
security law.8 These laws attempt to minimise the potential risk of identity
theft arising from data breaches and were required because corporations were
reluctant to notify data breaches either to potentially affected individuals or
regulatory authorities.9 The primary reason why organisations declined to
notify was the negative publicity that would be generated from the breach and
the concomitant potential damage to stock prices and to corporate
reputation.10
The first data breach notification law, implemented in California, had an
3 See, eg, Computer Security Institute and Federal Bureau of Investigation, ‘Computer Crime
and Security Survey’, Computer Security Institute and Federal Bureau of Investigation,
Washington, 2006.
4 See, eg, Department of Veterans Affairs Office of Inspector General, ‘Review of Issues
Related to the Loss of VA Information Involving the Identity of Millions of Veterans’,
Department of Veterans Affairs, Canberra, 2006.
5 See, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, ‘The Internal Revenue Service is
Not Adequately Protecting Taxpayer Data on Laptop Computers and Other Portable
Electronic Media Devices’, Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration, Washington
DC, 2007.
6 See, eg, Nj.Com, NJ Accidentally Reveals Personal Data of 28K Unemployed Residents,
New Jersey, 2009, at <http://www.nj.com/news/index.ssf/2009/05/3k_unemployed_
nj_residents_may. html> at 9 June 2009 (accessed 20 July 2010).
7 Privacy Rights Clearinghouse, A Chronology of Data Breaches, Privacy Rights
Clearinghouse, San Diego, 2009, <http://www.privacyrights.org/ar/Chron
DataBreaches.htm#CP> (accessed 21 March 2010).
8 See eg, T J Smedinghoff, ‘Trends in the Law of Information Security’ (2005) 17(1)
Intellectual Property & Technology LJ 1.
9 See, eg, Assembly Committee on Business and Professions, ‘Hearing Note SB1386’,
Assembly Committee on Business and Professions, California, 2002, regarding background
to the development of the Californian law and the basis for its implementation.
10 See, eg, Computer Security Institute and Federal Bureau of Investigation, above n 3. Studies
also confirm a negative effect on share price but this is not a uniform result of data breaches.
See AAcquisti, A Friedman and R Telang, ‘Is There a Cost to Privacy Breaches? An Event
Study’, Paper presented at the 27th International Conference on Information Systems,
Milwaukee, USA, 2006; K Campbell et al, ‘The Economic Cost of Publicly Announced
Information Security Breaches: Empirical Evidence from the Stock Market’ (2003) 11(3) Jnl
of Computer Security 431; K M Gatzlaff and K Mccullough, ‘The Effect of Data Breaches
on Shareholder Wealth’ (2010) 13(1) Risk Management and Insurance Review 61; R Hasan
and W Yurcik, ‘Beyond Media Hype: Empirical Analysis of Disclosed Privacy Breaches
2005–2006 and a DataSet/Database Foundation for Future Work’, Paper presented at the The
Workshop on the Economics of Securing the Information Infrastructure, Washington DC,
23 October 2006; M Ishiguro et al, ‘The Effect of Information Security Incidents on
Corporate Values in the Japanese Stock Market’, Paper presented at the The Workshop on
the Economics of Securing the Information Infrastructure, Washington DC, 23 October
2006; K Kannan, J Rees and S Sridhar, ‘Market Reactions to Information Security Breach
Announcements: An Empirical Analysis’ (2007) 12(1) International Jnl of Electronic
Commerce 69. See also discussion at Part VC below regarding US studies in relation to
share price loss.
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imminent effect in exposing the number and scale of data breaches involving
corporations registered in that state. Data breach notification laws quickly
spread throughout other US state legislatures and a number of bills have been
put forward at the federal level but no law has yet been implemented.11 In
2008, the Australian Law Reform Commission (ALRC) released its final
report reviewing the operation of Australian privacy law under the PrivacyAct
1988 (Cth). In relation to data breach notification, the report concluded that
there was general support for the introduction of a mandatory national data
breach notification scheme in Australia.
However, it is possible that notification of data breaches to the Australian
Stock Exchange (ASX) may already be required under the continuous
disclosure regime founded under the Corporations Act 2001 (Cth) and the
ASX Listing Rules. The continuous disclosure obligations under the
Corporations Act and the Listing Rules require a corporation to inform the
ASX of information where the corporation is or becomes aware of any
information concerning it which could materially affect its share price or the
value of its securities.12 It is possible that this regime could already apply to
data breaches and notification would consequently be required to the ASX.
This article will therefore examine whether the notification of data breaches is
required by the continuous disclosure regime under the Corporations Act and
Listing Rules and, if so, whether it is an appropriate regime for the notification
of data breaches in Australia.
Part II of the article provides an overview of data breach notification law
including Australian developments. Part III provides a brief overview of the
legislative development of the continuous disclosure regime in Australia and
outlines the legal framework currently in operation. Part IV identifies the
requirements that must be met under the Corporations Act and the Listing
Rules in order to attract the continuous disclosure obligations. Part V
investigates whether data breaches fall within these requirements so as to
require notification of such incidents to the ASX. Finally we conclude the
article in Part VI by contrasting the fundamentally divergent purposes of
continuous disclosure and data breach notification which suggests that the
former is not an appropriate regulatory vehicle for the notification of security
breaches involving consumer personal information.
II Data breach notification law and Australian
developments
Although forms of mandatory data breach notification existed prior to the
development of US state-based laws,13 the inception of these laws are
normally associated with the United States, particularly the rapid proliferation
of state-based laws that started with California in 2003. The first data breach
notification law, Californian Civil Code § 1798.29(a), has been widely used as
11 See B St Amant, ‘Misplaced Role of Identity Theft in Triggering Public Notice of Database
Breaches’ (2007) 44 Harvard Jnl on Legislation 505 regarding details of US Federal
proposals.
12 ASX Listing Rule 3.1 and Corporations Act s 674.
13 See E Preston and P Turner, ‘The Global Rise of a Duty to Disclose Information Security
Breaches’ (2004) 22 John Marshall Jnl of Computer & Information Law 457 at 465.
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a model by other US state legislatures.14 The Californian law requires any
Californian business which has suffered a data breach of unencrypted and
computerised personal information, and which entails an unauthorised
acquisition by another person, to notify Californian residents about the
incident. The purpose of Californian Civil Code § 1789.29 is consequently
directly linked to the mitigation of identity theft. The law was intended to
provide a degree of protection for persons who may have been adversely
affected by a data breach by giving them an opportunity to mitigate
themselves from the negative consequences flowing from the breach, such as
losses occurring from identity theft.15
Affected individuals are to be notified within a timeframe that is expedient
and without reasonable delay.16 However, some states have also instigated
specific deadlines.17 Some states also require law enforcement agencies to be
notified of any security breach and other states also require notification to
credit reference agencies.18 A case in point is the notification requirements of
the Interagency Guidelines.19 These are guidelines developed by several
Federal Government agencies involved in financial regulation that inform
financial institutions about how and when to notify a breach which also
require notification to regulatory authorities.20 Virtually all state-based laws
have exceptions that allow organisations to delay the notification of a data
breach under certain circumstances, such as whether notification would
impede a criminal or civil investigation.21 Different laws also apply to
different types of organisations.22
Notification can also take different forms. Almost all state laws expect that
14 See a list of all US state-based laws at National Conference of State Legislatures, State
Security Breach Notification Laws, National Conference of State Legislatures, Washington
DC, 2009, <http://www.ncsl.org/IssuesResearch/TelecommunicationsInformation
Technology/SecurityBreachNotificationLaws/tabid/13489/Default.aspx> (accessed 4 May
2010).
15 T J Smedinghoff, ‘Security Breach Notification — Adapting to the Regulatory Framework’
(2005) 21(12) The Review of Banking & Financial Services 1.
16 See, eg, S C Honeywill, ‘Data Security and Data Breach Notification for Financial
Institutions’ (2006) 10 North Carolina Banking Institute 269 at 300, regarding the
importance of timely notification; S L Markus, ‘Unfair Warning: Breach Notificaiton in the
FCC’s Enhanced Telephone Records Safeguards’ (2008) 18 Cornell Jnl of Law and Public
Policy 247 at 262 detailing reasons for the need for timely notification.
17 See F J Garcia, ‘Data Protection, Breach Notification, and the Interplay between State and
Federal Law: The Experiments Need More Time’ (2007) 17(3) Fordham Intellectual
Property, Media & Entertainment LJ 693 at 709 outlining different approaches; M Turner,
Towards a Rational Personal Data Breach Notification Regime, 19, 2006, at
<http://www.infopolicy.org/files/downloads/data_breach.pdf> (accessed 20 August 2010)
outlining the rationale of expedient notification.
18 See J Heitzenrater, ‘Data Breach Notification Legislation: Recent Developments’ (2008)
Winter 2008–09 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 661 at 672
regarding a brief overview of law enforcement notification.
19 Office of the Comptroller of the Currency et al, ‘Interagency Guidance on Response
Programs for Unauthorized Access to Customer Information and Customer Notice’, Office
of the Comptroller of the Currency et al, Washington DC, 2005.
20 See P M Schwartz and E J Janger, ‘Notification of Data Security Breaches’ (2007) 105(5)
Michigan L Rev 916, regarding application of the guidelines.
21 See, eg, Garcia, above n 17, at 708.
22 See M G Bingisser, ‘Data Privacy and Breach Reporting: Compliance with Varying State
Laws’(2008) 4(3) Shidler Jnl of Law, Commerce & Technology 1.
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notification should be provided in writing, either by letter, or by email, as long
as an individual has consented to receive notification by email and as long as
it is in accordance with federal law.23 However, breached organisations can
also provide substitute notice in situations where the cost of providing
individual notice amounts to a certain sum or involves a certain number of
persons, such as $US250,000 or 500,000 persons respectively under the
Californian law.24 In these circumstances, breached organisations can post a
conspicuous notice on their website and notify all major state-wide media
outlets about the breach.25
Some data breaches are exempt from notification. If breached information
is publicly available then it is already deemed to be in the public domain so
there is little risk of identity theft materialising from the breach.26 A general
exemption also exists relating to ‘good faith acquisitions’ of personal
information by an employee or agent of the breached organisation.
Furthermore, state-based data breach notification laws generally only require
notification for unencrypted forms of personal information.27 The Californian
law does not define encryption.28 Other states have attempted to further extend
the boundaries of the Californian encryption exemption to include further
elements.29 Other states have also attempted to define encryption but have
done so in different ways to different effect.30
Accordingly, there are variations between different state-based laws but the
major difference regards the statutory obligation that triggers notification. Two
forms of notification trigger have been identified: acquisition-based and
risk-based.31 The former requires notification where personal information has
been acquired or believed to have been acquired without authorisation.
Accordingly, corporations are required to notify individuals regardless of
whether there has actually been an unauthorised acquisition or whether there
is no risk arising from the data breach.32 Risk-based triggers, on the other
hand, only require notification where the breached corporation has identified
a risk arising from the data breach. It should also be noted that different
standards exist as to what triggers notification under a risk-based trigger.
Some state laws have higher or lower standards and require a reasonable
23 Smedinghoff, above n 8, at 1.
24 See, eg, CAL CIV CODE § 1789.29(a)(3) (West 2003).
25 See, eg, CAL CIV CODE § 1789.29(a)(3)(B)&(C) (West 2003).
26 T H Skinner, ‘California’s Database Breach Notification Security Act: The First State Breach
Notification Law is Not Yet a Suitable Template for National Identity Theft Legislation’
(2003) 10(1) Richmond Jnl of Law & Technology at [19].
27 See Honeywill, above n 16, at 298 supporting the purpose of an encryption exemption.
28 Skinner, above n 26, at [46].
29 S Lee, ‘Breach Notification Laws: Notification Requirements and Data Safeguarding Now
Apply to Everyone, Including Entrepreneurs’ (2006) 1(1) Entrepreneurial Business LJ 125
at 130, highlighting the addition of further statutory terms.
30 See, eg, M Burdon, J Reid and R Low, ‘Encryption Safe Harbours and Data Breach
Notification Laws’ (2010) 26(5) Computer Law & Security Review 520.
31 M E Jones, ‘Data Breaches: Recent Developments in the Public and Private Sectors’ (2007)
3 I/S: A Journal of Law and Policy for the Information Society 555.
32 F H Cate, Information Security Breaches: Looking Back and Thinking Ahead, 2008,
<http://www.hunton.com/files/tbl_s47Details/FileUpload265/2308/Information_
Security_Breaches_Cate.pdf> (accessed 19 March 2010).
74 (2010) 25 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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likelihood that harm may arise33 where others require a significant or material
real risk of identity theft34 or a reasonable likelihood of substantial economic
loss.35 The purpose of a higher trigger is to reduce the potential of ‘notification
fatigue’36 caused by unnecessary notification.
Despite differences regarding notification triggers, the underlying premise
of all state laws is to give an opportunity to individuals to protect themselves
from identity theft risks arising potentially from a data breach.37 Data breach
notification laws were also developed to encourage corporations to employ
effective forms of personal information protection through the notion of
‘reputational sanction’.38 The embarrassment factor has been a significant
regulatory tool to counteract the lack of market-based incentives aimed at
enhancing corporate information security measures. In effect, the negative
publicity that arises from notification is an incentive for organisations to invest
in information security and thus avoid the detrimental impact on share price
that can result through notification.39 As such, data breach notification laws
have both an ex ante role through the encouragement of information security
measures and an ex post role through notification.40
Data breach notification laws have been implemented throughout the
world41 including the newly updated e-Privacy Directive42 in the European
Union. It is therefore not surprising that similar developments have been put
forward in Australia. In 2007, the Australian Democrats put forward a private
members’ bill to amend the Privacy Act and to include a mandatory data
breach notification obligation.43 Furthermore, in 2008, the Federal Privacy
Commissioner released voluntary data breach notification guidelines that are
33 See ALASKA STAT § 45.48.010 (Michie 2009); ARK CODE ANN § 4-110-105 (Michie
2005); FLA STAT § 817.5681 (2005); LA REV STAT ANN §§ 51:3071 (West 2005).
34 See KAN STATANN §§ 50-7a01 (2006); MD CODEANN §§ 14-3501 (2008); MASS GEN
LAWS 93H § 1 (2007); MICH COMP LAWS § 445.72 (2007); OHIO REV CODE ANN §
1349.19 (West 2005); R I GEN LAWS § 11-49.2–1 (2005); UTAH CODE ANN
§§ 13-42-101 (2006); WIS STAT § 895.507 (2006).
35 See ARIZ REV STAT § 44-7501 (2007).
36 See Schwartz and Janger, above n 20, at 916; Cate, above n 32, p 12.
37 See Smedinghoff, above n 8, at 4.
38 Schwartz and Janger, above n 20, at 913.
39 See AusCERT, ‘Australian Crime & Security Survey’, AusCERT, Queensland, 2006, p 35
regarding a government survey that confirmed corporate entities chose not to inform about
data breaches in fear of detrimental publicity. But see Acquisti, Friedman and Telang, above
n 10 and Kannan, Rees and Sridhar, above n 10, at 69 for research findings which questions
the general corporate belief regarding the severe and negative impact on share price for
notifying organisations.
40 S Romanosky and A Acquisti, ‘Privacy Costs and Personal Data Protection: Economic and
Legal Perspectives’ (2009) 24(3) Berkeley Technology LJ 1061.
41 See A Maurushat, Data Breach Notification Law Across the World from California to
Australia, 2009, <http://law.bepress.com/unswwps/flrps09/art11/> (accessed 20 March
2010) for an overview of international developments.
42 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/22/EC on
universal service and users’ rights relating to electronic communications networks and
services, Directive 2002/58/EC concerning the processing of personal data and the
protection of privacy in the electronic communications sector and Regulation (EC) No
2006/2004 on cooperation between national authorities responsible for the enforcement of
consumer protection laws.
43 Privacy (Data Security Breach Notification) Amendment Bill 2007.
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aimed to help organisations on how to respond effectively to a data breach.44
Of more significant importance, is the ALRC’s review of Australian privacy
law45 which recommended the implementation of an Australian data breach
notification scheme through the Privacy Act.
The ALRC identified data breach notification as a prominent issue in its
2007 Discussion Paper.46 The commission noted that data breach notification
law was becoming increasingly topical throughout the world. A brief overview
of the US rationale for data breach notification was identified as identity theft
mitigation and the lack of market incentives for notification was further
outlined.47 A theoretical framework founded on Solove’s conceptualisation of
data misuse problems48 in conjunction with general approaches to regulation
as specified by Baldwin and Cave was put forward.49 The ALRC appeared to
be heavily influenced by Solove’s data abuse pyramid50 which attempts to
categorise situations of data misuse, data leaks and data insecurity.51 Misuses
feature at the apex of the pyramid and represent intentional acts to defraud
through the use of personal information. Leaks occupy the middle tier and
entail situations where personal information has been improperly released.
Finally, at the bottom, insecurity entails breaches that arise through inadequate
information security measures. The ALRC noted that there was currently no
obligation to report data leaks and this lack of regulatory oversight could
increase the risks of identity theft to individuals.52 Accordingly, notification
would assist to minimise damage caused by a breach.53 More importantly, in
terms of this article, the ALRC also noted that data breach notification could
be used as a mechanism to correct market failures:
Even more broadly, notification of security breaches can play an important role in
keeping the market informed of the privacy practices of organisations. As Baldwin
and Cave suggest, ‘competitive markets can only function properly if consumers are
sufficiently well informed to evaluate competing products’. In the absence of
notification, a data breach causes an ‘information inadequacy’, as the organisation
knows that there has been an unauthorised acquisition of an individual’s personal
information, but the individual affected does not. Thus, until the individual is
notified of a security breach, there may be inadequate information in the market for
individuals to evaluate the different personal information-handling practices of
organisations. Notification can provide insight into an organisation’s security
44 Office of the Privacy Commissioner, ‘Guide to Handling Personal Information Security
Breaches’, Office of the Privacy Commissioner, Canberra, 2008.
45 ALRC, For Your Information: Australian Privacy Law and Practice, Australian Law
Reform Commission, Canberra, 2008.
46 ALRC, ‘Review of Australian Privacy Law,’ Discussion Paper 72, Australian Law Reform
Commission, Canberra, 2007, pp 1293–1316.
47 Ibid, p 1296.
48 D J Solove, ‘The New Vulnerability: Data Security and Personal Information,’ in M J Radin
and A Chander (Eds), Securing Privacy in the Internet Age, Stanford University Press,
California, 2005.
49 R Baldwin and M Cave, Understanding Regulation: Theory, Strategy, and Practice, Oxford
University Press, Oxford, 1999.
50 Solove, above n 48.
51 ALRC, above n 46, p 1309.
52 Ibid, p 1310.
53 Ibid.
76 (2010) 25 Australian Journal of Corporate Law
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practices and help inform the market about the vulnerabilities or weaknesses of a
particular organisation compared to others.54
At the point of final reporting in 2008, data breach notification was seen by the
ALRC as being consistent with the general aims of the Privacy Act and would
therefore encourage agencies and organisations ‘to be transparent about their
information-handling practices’.55 The main focus of notification is the
mitigation of potential harms arising from a data breach as opposed to the
punitive elements of reputational sanction.56 The notification trigger
recommended is:
An agency or organisation is required to notify the Privacy Commissioner and
affected individuals when specified personal information has been, or is reasonably
believed to have been, acquired by an unauthorised person and the agency,
organisation or Privacy Commissioner believes that the unauthorised acquisition
may give rise to a real risk of serious harm to any affected individual.57
The notification trigger proposed by the ALRC is therefore a risk-based
rather than an acquisition-based trigger. The ALRC confirmed that fears of
notification fatigue were real and that a higher trigger would reduce such
concerns and corporate compliance burdens.58 A higher triggering threshold
would allow corporations to conduct a risk-based assessment to decide
whether the unauthorised acquisition could give rise to ‘a real risk of serious
harm to an individual’.59 There is also a clear departure from the US
state-based laws because the risk-assessments of ‘serious harm’ is not
restricted to identity theft harms but can also cover wider privacy concerns
regarding the unauthorised disclosure of personal information. The ALRC’s
risk-based trigger therefore would require corporations to decide themselves
when a data breach would trigger notification and to develop individualised
standards about what constitutes ‘a real risk of serious harm in the context of
their own operations’.60
However, the notification assessment is not purely administered from a
self-regulatory perspective because the ALRC also suggested an oversight
mechanism. The ALRC contended that it would be ‘preferable’ for
organisations to consult with the Privacy Commissioner regarding notification
to individuals. Under the proposal, the Privacy Commissioner would also be
granted powers to force corporations to notify in situations where the
Commissioner believes that the data breach gives rise to a real risk of serious
harm to individuals, but the corporation does not. These powers are also
supplemented by the Commissioner’s ability to impose civil penalties against
corporations that have failed to notify the Commissioner about a reportable
data breach or where corporations disregard data breach provisions. In reply
to the ALRC’s proposal, the Australian Government has indicated that the
issue of data breach notification would be addressed in a second tranche of
54 Ibid, p 1311.
55 Ibid, p 1688.
56 Ibid, p 1689.
57 Ibid.
58 Ibid, p 1691.
59 Ibid, p 1690.
60 Ibid, p 1691.
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proposed measures planned for 2010.61 It seems likely therefore that a data
breach notification scheme could be introduced in Australia during the next
couple of years.
III The continuous disclosure regime
The continuous disclosure obligations in Australia are currently contained in
both the Corporations Act and the Listing Rules. In order to assure an
efficient,62 fair,63 and transparent64 securities market65 (particularly the
secondary market in securities), continuous disclosure obligations were
originally introduced through the Listing Rules, operating as a contractual
agreement between the ASX and the entities listed on the ASX.66
In June 1991, the Commonwealth Attorney-General, Mr Michael Duffy,
requested the Companies and Securities Advisory Committee (CASAC) to
examine the need for a statutory based continuous disclosure regime in
Australia.67 CASAC reported that a statutory based system of continuous
disclosure would promote confidence in the integrity of the Australian capital
markets.68 The committee recommended the introduction of statutory based
continuous disclosure requirements for disclosing entities would have a
number of specific benefits.69 CASAC indicated that, in its view, continuous
disclosure would:
• Overcome the inability of general market forces to guarantee adequate and
timely disclosure by disclosing entities;
• Encourage greater securities research by investors and advisors, thereby
ensuring that securities prices more closely, and quickly, reflect underlying
economic values;
61 See Cabinet Secretary Special Minister of State, Report on Australian Privacy Law and
Practice, Cabinet Secretary Special Minister of State, Canberra, 2008, at <http://www.
smos.gov.au/media/2008/mr_262008_joint.html> (accessed 14 June 2010).
62 See J C Coffee Jr, ‘Market Failure and the Economic Case for a Mandatory Disclosure
System’ (1984) 70 Virginia L Rev 717; E F Fama, ‘Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of
Theory and Empirical Work’ (1970) 25(2) The Jnl of Finance 383; See also M Blair and
I Ramsey, ‘Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Rules and Securities Regulation’ in G Walker,
B Fisse and I Ramsay (Eds), Securities Regulation in Australia and New Zealand, 2nd ed,
LBC Information Services, Sydney, 1998.
63 M Kahan, ‘Securities Laws and the Social Costs of “Inaccurate” Stock Prices’ (1992) Duke
LJ 977; M Blair, ‘The Debate over Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Rules’ (1992) 15(1)
UNSWLJ 177.
64 Continuous disclosure reduces the opportunities for trading with information dissymmetry.
See L Semann, M Freeman and M Adams, ‘Is Insider Trading a Necessary Evil for Efficient
Markets?: An International Comparative Analysis’ (1999) 17 C&SLJ 220.
65 The International Organisation of Securities Commissions in its Objectives and Principles of
Securities Regulation, IOSCO, Madrid, May 2003, at <http://www.iosco.org/
library/pubdocs/pdf/IOSCOPD154.pdf> (accessed 19 October 2010) has indicated that
securities regulation generally has three objectives: (1) protection of investors; (2) ensuring
that markets are fair, efficient and transparent, and (3) reduction of systemic risk.
66 This contract also had statutory recognition: See s 777 of the Corporations Law 1991 and
Corporations Act 2001.
67 CASAC, ‘Report On An Enhanced Statutory Disclosure System’, CASAC, Sydney, 1991,
p 1.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid.
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• Ensure that equity and loan resources in the Australian market are more
effectively channelled into appropriate investments, and that funds are
withheld or withdrawn from poorly performing disclosing entities. This will
promote capital market efficiency;
• Assist debt holders in monitoring the performance of disclosing entities and
thereby determine whether, or when, to exercise any right to withdraw or
reinvest their loan funds, or convert debt to equity;
• Act as a further, or substitute warning device for holders of charges over
corporate assets, that breaches in covenants may have taken place, or the risk
of default has increased;
• Assist potential equity or debt holders of disclosing entities to better evaluate
their investment alternatives;
• Lessen the possible distorting effects of rumour on securities prices;
• Minimise the opportunities for insider trading or similar market abuses;
• Improve managerial performance and accountability by giving the market
more timely indicators of corporate performance;
• Encourage the growth of information systems within disclosing entities. This
assists directors in their decision-making and compliance with their fiduciary
duties; and
• Reduce the time and costs involved when preparing takeover and prospectus
documents.70
As these objectives indicate, the articulated purposes underlying continuous
disclosure in Australia, rather than being expressed primarily as consumer
protection,71 were predominantly to assure that the market itself operated in a
fair, efficient and transparent way.72
Following this recommendation, amendments were made to the
Corporations Act by the Corporate Law Reform Bill 1993 (Cth) which was
enacted as the Corporate Law Reform Act 1994 (Cth). The Corporate Law
Reform Act commenced on 4 September 1994 and the continuous disclosure
provisions were introduced into the Corporations Act as ss 1001A, 1001B,
1001C and 1001D. These amendments provided statutory backing for the
disclosure obligations under the ASX Listing Rules.73 The Financial Services
Reform Act 2001 (Cth), which commenced operation on 11 March 2002,
replaced s 1001D of the Corporations Act with s 674 in a new Ch 6CA. Thus
at present, the continuous disclosure provisions are contained in Ch 6CA of
the Corporations Act.74
The provisions of Ch 6CA impose obligations on disclosing entities to
disclose information where the entity becomes aware of information that is not
generally available that has a material effect on the price or value of the
70 Ibid, p 7.
71 Although it is clear that such a market would enhance consumer protection. See F H
Easterbrook and D R Fischel, ‘Mandatory Disclosure and the Protection of Investors’ (1984)
70 Virginia L Rev 669.
72 See also G Golding and N Calfus, ‘The Continuous Evolution of Australia’s Continuous
Disclosure Regime’ (2004) 22 C&SLJ 385.
73 Ibid, at 385; M Nehme, M Hyland and M Adams, ‘Enforcement of Continuous Disclosure:
The Use of Infringement Notice and Alternative Sanction’ (2007) 21 Aust Jnl of Corp Law
112; J Coffey, ‘Enforcement of Continuous Disclosure in the Australian Stock Market’
(2007) 20 Aust Jnl of Corp Law 301, and A Zandstra, J Harris and A Hargovan, ‘Widening
the Net: Accessorial Liability for Continuous Disclosure Contraventions’ (2008) 22 Aust Jnl
of Corp Law 51.
74 Ibid.
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entity’s securities.75 Only disclosing entities are subject to the continuous
disclosure obligations under the Corporations Act.76 Disclosing entities are
entities where the securities of the entity are ‘Enhanced Disclosure (ED)
securities’.77 Securities in a class of securities issued by a body corporate,
where the body corporate is included in the official list of a prescribed
financial market and the market’s listing rules apply to the body in relation to
that class of securities, are ED Securities.78
The Corporations Act distinguishes between listed and unlisted disclosing
entities. A disclosing entity is a listed disclosing entity if all or any ED
securities of the entity are quoted ED securities79 and an unlisted disclosing
entity is a disclosing entity that is not a listed disclosing entity.80 Different
disclosure requirements apply depending on whether the entity is a listed or
unlisted disclosing entity.81 The focus of this article is on listed disclosing
entities whose securities are listed on the ASX, which is a prescribed financial
market.82 An infringement of the continuous disclosure requirements under
the Corporations Act can lead to criminal and civil sanctions.83 Liability can
also extend to a person who is involved in a listed entity’s failure to disclose.84
As noted above, the continuous disclosure obligations in the Corporations
Act is located in Ch 6CA. Section 674(2) provides that if the information is
not generally available and it is information that a reasonable person would
expect, if it were generally available, to have a material effect on the price or
value of ED securities of the entity, the entity must notify the market operator
of that information. However, s 674(2) only applies when the provisions of the
listing rules of a listing market in relation to that entity require the entity to
notify the market operator of information about specified events or matters.85
Thus the source of the continuous disclosure obligation under the
Corporations Act is the Listing Rules of the market operator, which for the
purposes of this article, is the ASX. Chapter 3 of the Listing Rules sets out the
continuous disclosure requirements that an entity must satisfy. Listing
Rule 3.1 provides:
Once an entity is or becomes aware of information concerning it that a reasonable
person would expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the entity’s
securities, the entity must immediately tell ASX that information.86
75 Corporations Act s 674.
76 Corporations Act s 111AP.
77 Corporations Act s 111AC(1).
78 Corporations Act ss 111AD and 111AE(1).
79 Corporations Act s 111AL(1).
80 Corporations Act s 111AL(2).
81 R P Austin and M Ramsay, Ford’s Principles of Corporations Law, LexisNexis, Sydney,
2010, at [10.290] and [10.350] and CASAC, ‘Report On Continous Disclosure’, CASAC,
Sydney, 1996, at 2.6.
82 The ASX is a ‘prescribed financial market’: Corporation Regulations 2001 (Cth)
reg 7.1.01(a).
83 Corporations Act s 674(2).
84 Corporations Act s 674(2A).
85 Corporations Act s 674(1).
86 Listing Rule 3.1.
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Listing Rule 3.1A then goes on to provide that a corporation is not required to
disclose if each of the qualifications listed in Listing Rule 3.1A are satisfied.
So to come under the disclosure obligations under the Listing Rules, the
following requirements must be met:
(1) There must be information;
(2) The entity is aware of the information; and
(3) A reasonable person would expect the information to have a material effect
on the price or value of the entity’s securities; and
(4) None of the qualifications listed in Listing Rule 3.1A apply.
If there is an obligation to disclose under Listing Rule 3.1 and the
exceptions in Listing Rule 3.1A do not apply, then s 674(2) takes effect and
disclosure of information, where the information is not generally available,
and where a reasonable person would expect the information to have a
material effect on price or value the entity’s securities, is required. The
requirements of s 674(2) thus mirror Listing Rule 3.1 with the exception of the
requirement for ‘generally available information’.87
In short, an entity is required to disclose information if there is an obligation
to do so under Listing Rule 3.1. If there is an obligation to disclose under
Listing Rule 3.1 and the information to be disclosed is not generally available
within the meaning of s 674(2), then the entity has infringed the disclosure
requirements under the Corporations Act. The table below lists the
requirements to Listing Rule 3.1 and s 674.
Table 1 — ASX and Corporations Act Requirements
Requirements Listing Rule 3.1 Section 674(2)
There must have existed ‘information’ X X
The entity must have been aware of that
information
X X
A reasonable person would have expected
that information to have had a material
effect on the price or value of the entity’s
shares; if it had been generally available
X X
The qualifications or ‘carve-outs’ in
Listing Rule 3.1A do not apply
X
The information must not have been
generally available
X
IV The requirements for continuous disclosure
The following Part discusses the requirements that must be met in order to
attract the disclosure obligations under the Listing Rules and the Corporations
Act. Each requirement is discussed below and Part V will then examine
87 As stated above, this requirement is found in Corporations Act s 674(2) which provides that
if the ‘information is not generally available and is information that a reasonable person
would expect, if it were generally available, to have a material effect on the price or value
of ED securities of the entity, the entity must notify the market operator of that information
in accordance with those provisions’.
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whether the occurrence of a data breach will meet these requirements, thereby
attracting an obligation to disclose under the Listing Rules and the
Corporations Act.
A Information
Neither the Listing Rules nor the Corporations Act define what is meant by
‘information’.88 The note to Listing Rule 3.1 provides that ‘information’ may
include information necessary to prevent or correct a false market. It gives
examples as to the types of information that would require disclosure if found
to be material under Listing Rule 3.1. These include:
• A change in the entity’s financial forecast or expectation;
• Giving or receiving a notice of intention to make a takeover; and
• A change in accounting policy adopted by the entity.89
A publication by the ASX in 2002 describes price or value sensitive
information as including ‘information about such things as earnings, mergers,
acquisitions, joint ventures, changes in assets, new products or discoveries,
developments regarding customers or suppliers and changes in control of
management’.90 Further guidance as to what may constitute information can
be obtained from two recent cases on the continuous disclosure obligations
provisions of the Corporations Act and the Listing Rules. They are Jubilee
Mines NL v Riley91 and ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd.92
In Jubilee Mines NL v Riley, the plaintiff was a junior exploration company
and during the period 1992 and 1993 its focus was on exploring its tenements
for gold. Mr Crossley, Jubilee’s managing director, and Mr Cooke, a geologist,
were responsible for Jubilee’s day to day operations. In 1994, Western Mining
Company (WMC) advised Jubilee that it had inadvertently drilled on Jubilee’s
neighbouring tenement and the drilling data was provided to Jubilee. The
geologist, Mr Cooke, reviewed the information provided by WMC. His views
were that the prospect of proving an economic nickel deposit on Jubilee’s
tenement was remote and given Jubilee’s financial position and its focus,
which was on gold, further exploration on the tenement was not appropriate.93
The geologist discussed his views with the managing director and in light of
the geologist’s views, the managing director decided that the information
received from WMC was not of any interest or significance to Jubilee and
there was no requirement to disclose receipt of the data to the ASX.94
However in 1995, Mr Crossley resigned as managing director of Jubilee and
was replaced by a Mr Harmanis.
88 Jubilee Mines NL v Riley (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62;
BC200901632 at [159].
89 ASX Listing Rule Ch 3, 302.
90 ASX, ‘Continuous Disclosure: The Australian Experience’, ASX, Sydney, 2002, at 4.2.
91 (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62; BC200901632.
92 (2009) 264 ALR 201; 76 ACSR 506; [2009] FCA 1586; BC200912077. Apart from these
two cases, there is limited case law on the continuous disclosure provisions of the
Corporations Act and the Listing Rules. This point was observed both in Martin CJ’s
judgment and McLure’s judgment in Jubilee Mines NL v Riley (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226
FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62; BC200901632 at [52] and [152].
93 Jubilee Mines NL v Riley (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62;
BC200901632 at [10]–[11].
94 Ibid, at [12].
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In 1996, further discussions were held between WMC and Jubilee in
relation to the tenement and the drill hole results. Following from these
discussions, on 11 June 1996 Jubilee provided an announcement to the ASX
disclosing the inadvertent drilling of the tenement by WMC and announcing
that ‘significant potential exists for both massive and disseminated nickel
sulphides’.95 The announcement further advised that Jubilee intended to
undertake further drilling work to explore the mineralisation.96 Riley, who had
Jubilee shares allocated to a trust under his control, had caused the trust in
1994 to progressively sell all of its shares in Jubilee. By 1995, all the shares
were sold.97 Riley argued that Jubilee breached the Listing Rules and the
Corporations Act by not promptly disclosing the exploration results received
from WMC. Master Sanderson of the WA Supreme Court awarded Riley
damages of $1,856,000 plus interest of $1,005,133.33. Jubilee Mines appealed
and the WACourt of Appeal upheld Jubilee’s appeal from Master Sanderson’s
decision.98
On appeal, Jubilee argued that information for the purposes of the
continuous disclosure obligations included the assessment by Jubilee’s
geologist of the prospectivity of the tenement, the nature of Jubilee’s then
current activities and its financial capacity.99 Riley argued that evaluative
matters were not part of the ‘information’ for the purposes of the Listing Rule
and Corporations Act.100
Martin CJ in the Court of Appeal delivered the main judgment with which
Le Miere AJA agreed. McLure JA delivered a separate judgment. Both
Martin CJ and McLure JA held that information included Jubilee’s decision
not to undertake further drilling.101 Justice McLure said that information must
include ‘all matters of fact, opinion and intention’102 so that an expert opinion
on the significance of the WMC Information would be a part of the
information concerning Jubilee of which Jubilee’s executive officers (Cooke
and Crossley) were aware.103 Her Honour came to this conclusion based on
the purpose of the continuous disclosure regime, which is a fully informed
market,104 noting that:
where share price sensitivity depends upon the company having an expert
assessment of core information and business decisions are made based on that expert
assessment, the disclosure of only the core information . . . may be misleading.105
This interpretation of ‘information’ in Jubilee Mines was adopted by
Gilmour J in ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd. In Fortescue, Gilmour J
observed that information is a ‘concept of very broad import’ and can include
95 Ibid, at [20].
96 Ibid, at [19]–[20].
97 Ibid, at [6].
98 Ibid.
99 Ibid, at [158].
100 Ibid, at [157].
101 Ibid, at [110]–[113] and [191].
102 Ibid, at [161].
103 Ibid, at [160].
104 Ibid, at [162].
105 Ibid, at [162].
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both fact and opinion.106 Jubilee Mines and Fortescue are the leading cases on
the continuous disclosure requirements under the Listing Rules and the
Corporations Act and if their approach is adopted, it appears that information
can include a combination of both fact and opinion.
B Awareness of information
The concept of awareness is central to the operation of the continuous
disclosure regime.107 Listing Rule 3.1 requires an entity to be aware of
information before it is required to disclose that information to the ASX.
According to Listing Rule 19.12:
an entity becomes aware of information if a director or executive officer has, or
ought reasonably to have, come into possession of the information in the course of
the performance of their duties as a director or executive officer of that entity.
Thus in Jubilee Mines both Cooke and Crossley were held to be the executive
officers of Jubilee and therefore Jubilee was taken to be aware of the
information coming into the possession or ought reasonably to have come into
the possession of Cooke or Crossley in the performance of their duties.108
C Material effect on the price or value
The obligation to disclose only arises if the information is information which
a reasonable person would expect to have a material effect on the price or
value of its securities. Section 677 sets out the test for material as follows:
for the purposes of section 674 and 675 a reasonable person would be taken to
expect information to have a material effect on the price or value of ED securities
of a disclosing entity if the information would, or would be likely to, influence
persons who commonly invest in securities in deciding whether or not to acquire or
dispose of the ED securities.
The effect of this test in s 677 is to create terminological differences between
the Corporations Act and the Listing Rule.109 The requirement under the
Listing Rule is for the information to have a material effect on the price or
value of the securities whereas s 677 deems110 information to have that effect
if it would or would be likely to influence common investors. This raises the
question: Must information have a material effect on price or value or is it
suffıcient that the information would or would be likely to influence common
investors?
This issue was dealt with extensively in Jubilee Mines111 and the judgment
106 (2009) 264 ALR 201; 76 ACSR 506; [2009] FCA 1586; BC200912077 at [253].
107 ASX, above n 90, [2.1].
108 (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62; BC200901632 at [43].
109 ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd (No 5) (2009) 264 ALR 201; 76 ACSR 506; [2009]
FCA 1586; BC200912077 at [232] and [236]; Jubilee Mines NL v Riley (2009) 253 ALR
673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62; BC200901632 at [165].
110 Section 677 has been described by both Gilmour J in ASIC v Fortescue Metals Group Ltd
(No 5) (2009) 264 ALR 201; 76 ACSR 506; [2009] FCA 1586; BC200912077 at [232], and
Martin CJ in Jubilee Mines NL v Riley (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA
62; BC200901632 at [57], as a deeming provision.
111 (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62; BC200901632. This case
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in Jubilee Mines was considered by Gilmour J in Fortescue.112 Martin CJ in
Jubilee Mines held that s 1001D did not require the information to have a
‘material’ effect on the share price.113 His Honour noted that:
The effect of the section was to obviate the need to address the question of whether
a reasonable person would be taken to expect a ‘material’ effect on price to be
produced by deeming that question to be answered in the affirmative if the
information would, or would be likely to, influence persons who commonly invest
in the relevant securities in deciding whether or not to subscribe for, or buy or sell
those securities.114
Thus according to Martin CJ, if information had the characteristic defined in
s 1001D,115 it should be taken as information falling within the scope of the
Listing Rules.116 Otherwise there would be inconsistency between the Listing
Rules and ss 1001A and 1001D because the Listing Rules required notification
only when there was a reasonably expected material impact on share price or
value whereas ss 1001A and 1001D would require notification whenever the
information would, or would be likely to, influence common investors.117
In Fortescue, Gilmour J preferred the approach taken by Martin CJ:
I would construe ‘information’ which ‘would, or would be likely to influence’
common investors in deciding whether to acquire or dispose of securities as
information, for the purposes of Listing Rule 3.1, that a reasonable person would
expect to have a material effect on the price or value of the securities. This is merely
an approach to the construction of the words ‘material effect on the price or value
of the entity’s securities’ in Listing Rule 3.1 which provides harmony with the
provisions of ss 674 and 677 of the Act.118
In terms of whether the information would, or would be likely to influence
persons who commonly invest in securities, ASIC in Fortescue submitted that
the test for ‘influence’ in s 677 should be that of a:
common sense test for the court upon a consideration of the primary facts although
assistance may be derived from experts who professionally buy and sell shares in
large tranches and make investment decisions of the kind contemplated by s 677.119
This submission was accepted by Gilmour J in Fortescue.120As to who might
constitute ‘persons who commonly invest in securities’, in Jubilee Mines, it
was decided in the trial case and not challenged on appeal that a person who
commonly invested in securities of the kind in question, which in Jubilee’s
case was shares of a junior mining explorer, were traders who would be
considered the previous ss 1001A and 1001D but the observations are still relevant as the
provisions are substantially the same. See the Revised Explanatory Memorandum for the
Financial Services Reform Bill 2001 (Cth).
112 (2009) 264 ALR 201; 76 ACSR 506; [2009] FCA 1586; BC200912077.
113 (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62; BC200901632 at [34].
114 Ibid, at [34].
115 Section 1001D is the predecessor to s 677 which defines material effect.
116 Jubilee Mines NL v Riley (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62;
BC200901632 at [54]–[62].
117 Ibid, at [60]–[61].
118 (2009) 264 ALR 201; 76 ACSR 506; [2009] FCA 1586; BC200912077 at [238].
119 Ibid, at [482].
120 Ibid, at [482].
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looking to derive profit from an increase in share price, not long term investors
seeking dividend terms.121 The issue is therefore likely to be decided on a
case-by-case basis.
D Exceptions or carve outs under Listing Rule 3.1A
There is no obligation to disclose under the Listing Rule if the exceptions
under Listing Rule 3.1A apply. According to the ASX Guidance Note 8, the
intention of this exception is ‘to protect the legitimate commercial interests of
listed entities in those circumstances where market integrity is not adversely
affected’122 and only operates so long as the integrity of the market is not
undermined.123 To come within the ambit of Listing Rule 3.1A, the entity must
satisfy all of the three requirements in Listing Rules 3.1A.1, 3.1A.2 and
3.1A.3.
A requirement of Listing Rule 3.1A.1 is that a reasonable person would not
expect the information to be disclosed. According to ASX Guidance Note 8,
‘a reasonable person would not expect information to be disclosed if the result
would be unreasonably prejudicial to the entity’.124 In deciding this, the needs
of the market and the interests of the entity will be considered by the ASX.125
While the use of the word ‘reasonable’ indicates an objective test, the
Guidance Note observed that because ‘market practices and expectations can
evolve, what is considered “reasonable may also change”’.126 Furthermore,
Listing Rule 3.1A.2 requires that the information is confidential and the ASX
has not formed the view that confidentiality is lost. According to the Listing
Rules, ‘confidential’ means confidential as a matter of fact.127 The ASX
Guidance Note 8 provides further guidance stating that confidentiality has the
sense of ‘secret’128 because ‘the information is in the possession of only those
who will not trade in the entity’s securities and there is control over the use
of the information’.129
The Listing Rules also provide that an entity may give information to third
parties in the ordinary course of its business and activities and continue to
satisfy 3.1A2 provided the entity retains control over the use and disclosure of
the information.130 Information will lose its confidentiality status if the
information, or part of it, becomes known either selectively or generally,
whether inadvertently or deliberately.131 If information becomes known by
others in circumstances where the entity does not retain control of its use and
disclosure, Listing Rule 3.1A2 is not satisfied, regardless of whether the entity
or a third party disclosed the information.132 The example provided is ‘where
there is a rumour circulating or media comment about the information and the
121 (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62; BC200901632 at [122] and [163].
122 ASX Guidance Note 8, at [28].
123 Ibid, at [30].
124 Ibid, at [31] and [33].
125 Ibid.
126 Ibid.
127 ASX Listing Rule Ch 3, 303.
128 ASX Guidance Note 8, at [34].
129 Ibid, at [34].
130 ASX Listing Rule Ch 3, 303.
131 Ibid.
132 Ibid.
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rumour or comment is reasonably specific, this will generally indicate that
confidentiality has been lost’.133 Confidentiality can be lost even if the entity
has entered into confidentiality arrangements and/or the information has come
from a source other than the entity.134 Loss of confidentiality can also be
indicated by otherwise unexplained changes to the price of the entity’s
securities, or by reference to the information in the media or analysts’
reports.135 The ASX Guidance Note provides that the ASX will take all the
circumstances of each case into account when determining if there is a loss of
confidentiality.136
A third requirement exists under Listing Rule 3.1A.3, namely, that the
information must be of the type in one of the following categories. If it is not
or it loses that character, then Listing Rule 3.1A.3 is not satisfied. The relevant
categories are whether the information type:
• Would lead to a infringement of a law if disclosed;
• Concerned an incomplete proposal or negotiation;
• Comprised matters of supposition or is insufficiently definite to warrant
disclosure;
• Generated for the internal management purposes of the entity; and
• A trade secret.137
The final requirement arises under Listing Rule 3.1B. Even if the previous
three obligations of Listing Rule 3.1A are satisfied, there may still be a
requirement to disclose. Listing Rule 3.1B provides that if the ASX considers
that there is or is likely to be a false market in an entity’s securities and asks
the entity to give it information to correct or prevent a false market, the entity
must give the ASX the information needed to correct or prevent the false
market. According to the Listing Rules, the ASX would consider that there is
or is likely to be a false market in the entity’s securities in the following
circumstances:
• The entity has information that has not been released to the market, such as
in the situation where all of the limbs of the exception in Listing Rules
3.1A.1, 3.1A.2 and 3.1A.3 are satisfied; and
• There is reasonably specific rumour or media comment in relation to the
entity that has not been confirmed or clarified by an announcement by the
entity to the market; and
• There is evidence that the rumour or comment is having, or the ASX forms
the view that the rumour or comment is likely to have an impact on the price
of the entity’s securities.138
The example provided by the ASX Guidance Note 8 is where an entity may
have information that it has not disclosed because the exception in Listing
Rule 3.1A applies.139 Comment about the information or part of it might then
be made through the media or other sources. However, the comment is
133 Ibid.
134 ASX Guidance Note 8, at [34].
135 Ibid, at [35].
136 Ibid.
137 Listing Rule 3.1A.3.
138 ASX Listing Rule Ch 3, 303.
139 ASX Guidance Note 8, at [44].
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inaccurate or only partly accurate, so that even though confidentiality has not
been lost, the inaccurate or partly accurate comment might result in a false
market in the entity’s securities.140
E Generally available information
The difference between Listing Rule 3.1 and s 674(2) is the requirement for
‘generally available information’. Listing Rule 3.1 does not require
information to be generally available for the obligation to arise. Rather, the
ASX Guidance Note 8 observes that ‘the fact that information is generally or
electively available is not an excuse for failing to disclose it under Listing
Rule 3.1’.141 The effect is that under Listing Rule 3.1, all price or value
sensitive information needs to be disclosed. In contrast, in order to contravene
the disclosure requirements under the Corporations Act, s 674(2) requires the
information to have the characteristic of not being generally available. This
difference was considered by CASAC in its report on continuous disclosure in
1996.142 The Advisory Committee supported this distinction because it found
that:
it would be difficult to justify imposing civil and/or criminal liability on listed
entities and their involved officers merely for failing to comply with the continuous
disclosure Listing Rule, where that information was in the public domain and was
available to investors and the market generally.143
Section 676(2) provides that information is generally available if:
(a) It consists of readily observable matter; or
(b) Without limiting the generality of paragraph (a), both of the following
subparagraphs apply:
(i) it has been made known in a manner that would, or would be likely
to, bring it to the attention of persons who commonly invest in
securities of a kind whose price or value might be affected by the
information; and
(ii) since it was made known, a reasonable period for it to be disseminated
among such persons has elapsed.
Section 676(3) further provides that information is also generally available if
it consists of deductions, conclusions or inferences made or drawn from
information referred to in s 676(2)(b)(a) or information made known as
mentioned in s 676(2)(b)(i).
Neither Jubilee Mines nor Fortescue examined what is meant by ‘generally
available’. In Jubilee Mines, Martin CJ did not discuss the requirement of
information not being generally available, his Honour simply noted that in that
case, the information was of that character.144 Guidance may be obtained from
insider trading cases where the term ‘generally available’ is used for insider
140 Ibid.
141 ASX Guidance Note 8, at [25].
142 CASAC, ‘Report on Continuous Disclosure,’ Companies and Securities Advisory
Committee, Sydney, 1996, at 3.29.
143 Ibid, at 3.30.
144 (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62; BC200901632 at [68].
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trading offences. In R v Firns145 the meaning of ‘generally available’ was
considered in relation to whether a decision of the Supreme Court of Papua
New Guinea announced in open court was generally available in that it
consisted of readily observable matter.146 The majority view was that
information is ‘readily observable’ regardless of how many people actually
observe the relevant information.147 Accordingly, the number of persons who
actually observe the information is irrelevant148 and ready observability is not
to be tested from the stance of a hypothetical person within Australia.149 If the
majority in R v Firns is followed, it could mean that information could be
considered to be a readily observable matter and thus is generally available
even if no one has actually observed it. With these requirements in mind,
Part V explores whether a data breach could be considered to be information
requiring disclosure under the Listing Rules and the Corporations Act.
V Are data breaches required to be notified under the
continuous disclosure regime?
Trying to ascertain whether any particular data breach will subject a
corporation to the continuous disclosure obligations would be similar to the
process applying to disclosure of other types of information. Accordingly,
concluding whether disclosure of a data breach is required under the Listing
Rules and the Corporations Act, will not always be clear cut. United States
research indicates that the critical element in triggering the continuous
disclosure obligation — that the disclosure of the data breach will have
material effect upon share price or value — varies from corporation to
corporation.150 The likely impact upon share price depends upon a number of
factors including the:
• Extent of the data breach;
• Likely liabilities which will arise as a result of the breach;
• Likely loss of confidence in the corporation’s systems as a result of
the data breach; and
• Nature of the corporation’s business (for example, whether secure
data collection storage is essential to the corporation’s business or, at
the other extreme, is merely an insignificant aspect of that business).
These various elements, discussed in more detail below, will be relevant in
determining whether the knowledge of the actual data breach is, once revealed
to the public, likely to affect the corporation’s future business. These matters
will have a direct bearing upon whether investors would discount the price of
shares in the corporation as a result of the fact that a data breach has occurred.
Ascertaining how investors collectively will react to such news has proved to
be difficult in the United States,151 and is likely to be so in Australia as well.
We now examine whether a data breach incident would be required to be
145 R v Firns (2001) 51 NSWLR 548; 161 FLR 294; [2001] NSWCCA 191; BC200102551.
146 Ibid, at [3] and [52].
147 Ibid, at [77].
148 Ibid, at [77].
149 Ibid, at [81] and [88].
150 In relation to the impact of disclosure generally, see nn 62ff.
151 US experience indicates that investors, like consumers, are becoming less likely to punish
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notified under the continuous disclosure regime of the Corporations Act and
the Listing Rules as applied in Jubilee Mines and Fortescue.
A Would a data breach be classed as information?
Given the broad interpretation of information adopted in Jubilee Mines and
Fortescue, it is likely that a data breach would be considered to be
‘information’ within the meaning of the Listing Rules and the Corporations
Act.
B Would a corporation be aware of a data breach?
While it seems likely that a data breach could amount to information given the
broad approach adopted in Jubilee Mines and Fortescue Metals, it is much
less apparent whether the breached corporate entity would be deemed to be
aware of a data breach. This reflects the technological, legal and social
complexities inherent in data breaches regarding a director’s or executive
officer’s ability to possess information about a data breach during the course
of the performance of their duties. If they are aware, then the entity is taken
to be ‘aware’ of the information, and must disclose the information about a
data breach incident immediately to the ASX. However, whether a director or
executive officer would or should know that a data breach has occurred is
likely to depend on the circumstances of the data breach as some incidents are
very different in nature to others.
The situations that constitute a data breach can vary and can include a
number of different scenarios involving the unauthorised acquisition of
personal information. Various taxonomies of data breach classifications have
been developed. Garcia, for example, groups different types of data breaches
into four categories based on the inadequate actions of breached entities.
Garcia’s taxonomy therefore covers negligent acts by the breached
organisation, criminal actions perpetrated against the breached organisation,
ineffective security practices and the loss of control of personal information
through the theft or loss of an organisation’s computer or media storage
equipment, particularly laptops.152 The US Government’s Government
Accountability Office (GAO) reviewed a number of data breaches and
adduced a broad taxonomy that involved data breaches involving intentional
actions relating to identity theft crimes153 and those involving negligent or
accidental losses.154 Finally, Curtin and Ayers, focus less on the ineffective
corporations involved in data breaches as the global extent of data breaches becomes known.
In this regard see J Chandler, ‘Negligence Liability for Breaches of Data Security’ (2008) 23
Banking & Finance Law Review 223 at 228:
Presumably the stock market will react less and less as it learns that the punishment from
consumers is mild and decreasing. These predictions may be supported by evidence of
market behaviour.
152 Garcia, above n 17, at 714–23.
153 United States Government Accountability Office, ‘Personal Information: Data Breaches Are
Frequent, but Evidence of Resulting Identity Theft Is Limited; However, the Full Extent Is
Unknown’, GAO-07-737, 2007, p 19 which include hacking incidents, employee theft, theft
of physical equipment and acts of deception.
154 Ibid. These can include the loss of laptops or hardware, loss of tapes, unintentional exposure
on the internet and improper disposal of data.
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actions of breach organisations and examine the situations in which personal
information has been lost through a ‘failure of controls’.155 Curtin and Ayers
focus on controls is a helpful taxonomical base because it does not explicitly
or implicitly attempt to apportion blame upon a breached organisation, unlike
taxonomies based on negligent actions, and it therefore categorises data
breaches based on textual descriptions of actual data incidents. The taxonomy
highlights that corporations are more likely to be aware of some incidents and
less likely to be aware of others while indicating the areas where directors
should be aware of control failures.
The issue of control failures is therefore a prominent factor in relation to the
awareness levels required by corporations as different types of data breaches
will engender different awareness requirements. For example, the most
significant US data breach to date involved a computer hacking incident that
involved the TJX Corporation, which is the parent company of some of the
largest retailers in the United States. In 2007, identity theft criminals
penetrated the TJX system and retrieved without authorisation the details of
approximately 94 million credit cards.156 TJX failed to comply with the
Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data Security Standard (PCI-DSS),157
illustrated by the collection of an unnecessary amount of personal information
that was unencrypted. Moreover, the unauthorised intrusion was made
possible because TJX transferred personal and payment information between
retailers using a wireless network that was not sufficiently protected. The
wireless network was encrypted with wired equivalent privacy (WEP) security
protocols that were known to be ineffective and prone to vulnerabilities. A
team of sophisticated identity theft criminals was able to access the
communications system from which they gained entry to TJX’s corporate
headquarters and were able to retrieve credit card and other personal
information.158 It is believed the intruders had access to TJX’s database
systems for 18 months before they were detected.159
Potentially more disturbing for corporations is that data thefts can also
involve employees. Fidelity National Information Services, a financial
processing service, reported that a former employee at one of its subsidiary
companies, who was a senior database administrator, misappropriated
2.3 million records that included personal and credit card information.160 The
employee then sold details of the personal records to a number of direct
155 C M Curtin and L TAyres, Using Science to Combat Data Loss: Analyzing Breaches by Type
and Industry, 2009, <http://web.interhack.com/publications/breach-taxonomy> (accessed
29 April 2010), p 13.
156 G Berg, M Freeman and K Schneider, ‘Analyzing the TJ Maxx Data Security Fiasco:
Lessons for Auditors’ (2008) 78(8) The CPA Journal 34 at 36.
157 Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council, Payment Card Industry (PCI) Data
Security Standard Version 1.2.1, Payment Card Industry Security Standards Council,
Delaware, 2009.
158 Berg, Freeman and Schneider, above n 156, at 34.
159 J Pereira, ‘Breaking The Code: How Credit-Card Data Went Out Wireless Door In Biggest
Known Theft, Retailer’s Weak Security Lost Millions of Numbers’, The Wall Street Journal,
New York, 4 May 2007, A1.
160 See Fox News, 2.3M Records Containing Credit Card, Bank Account Information Stolen,
Financial Processing Company Says, 2007, <http://www.foxnews.com/
story/0,2933,287862,00.html> (accessed 23 April 2010), and A Greenberg, The
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marketing firms. Fidelity only became aware of the incident after it received
complaints from customers about phone marketing calls related to recent
purchases.161 Furthermore, the loss or theft of computer equipment has been
a problem that has plagued many corporate and governmental organisations.
The airplane maker, Boeing, announced that a laptop containing the personal
information of 382,000 past and present employees of the company had been
stolen. This incident resulted in the sacking of the employee who had been
assigned the laptop because the theft of the computer from the employee’s car
was deemed to be in breach of the company’s data protection policy.162 The
laptop was subsequently recovered and Boeing believed that the thief had not
accessed the personal data.163 Finally, data breaches can occur when
organisations inadvertently publish or transmit personal information to an
unintended audience. For example, Microsoft inadvertently published the
names of thousands of applicants for a web marketing promotion which
required applicants to submit personal information about Microsoft products
they used.164
These incidents demonstrate that data breaches arise in many different ways
even though they all involve a loss of control over personal information. The
extent that a director or executive officer is likely to be aware of such
problems will have to be judged on a case-by-case basis that involves a
rigorous and competent review of circumstances. That in itself could be
problematic. The directors in the TJX data breach should clearly have been
aware that the use of an outmoded encryption protocol and the
non-compliance of industry standards increased the vulnerability of the
corporation to a hacking attack. However, they were clearly unaware of these
problems because the hackers in the TJX incident were able to gain
unobstructed access for nearly 2 years. Likewise, in the Fidelity and Microsoft
incidents, the corporations only became aware of the data breaches following
customer complaints. The point at which a data breach comes to the attention
of a corporation is therefore likely to be of crucial importance and may not be
a clear-cut exercise to undertaken.
Some data breaches, such as the TJX incident, are based on situations that
involve the provision of inadequate security measures and normatively
proscribed obligations upon directors are therefore easier to identify.
Nonetheless, it needs to be recognised that some data breaches involving
hacking attacks are ground-breaking in their levels of sophistication.165 The
issue of corporate awareness is therefore likely to be a complex matter that
Cybercriminal Inside (2007) Forbes <http://www.forbes.com/2007/07/10/computer-
security-internal-biz-biztech-cx_ag_0710mcafee.html> (accessed 23 April 2010).
161 Ibid.
162 J Wallace, ‘Boeing Fires Employee Whose Laptop was stolen’, Seattle Post-Intellegencer,
Seattle, 14 December 2006.
163 Anonymous, ‘Stolen Boeing Laptop is Recovered’, Seattle Times, Seattle, 26 January 2007.
164 The Register, Microsoft.NET Promo Reveals Personal Info, 2008,
<http://www.theregister.co.uk/2002/03/27/microsoft_net_promo_reveals_personal/>
(accessed 23 April 2010).
165 See, eg, K Zetter, Google Hack Attack Was Ultra Sophisticated, New Details Show, Wired,
2010, at <http://www.wired.com/threatlevel/2010/01/operation-aurora> (accessed 23 April
2010) regarding details of a recent Chinese hacking attack perpetrated on Google, Adobe
and other leading US companies.
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should be assessed appropriately on a case-by-case basis through the
development of a related jurisprudential discourse. We contend that some data
breaches, such as the TJX incident are more likely to give rise to notification
requirements under the continuous disclosure scheme than others and thus we
suggest that directors and executive officers that ignore the requirements of
sound information security practices relating to personal information do so at
their peril. As such, data breach notification should be a component of risk
management for corporations that entails multi-faceted technical and legal
considerations.
C Would a data breach have a material effect on the
price or value of securities?
Equally, concluding that disclosure of a data breach will have a material effect
upon the price or value of securities (and thus is required under the Listing
Rules and the Corporations Act where it is not generally known to the public)
will depend upon a number of complex factors. For example, the extent of the
breach will be an important issue. As highlighted in the previous subsection,
the concept of a data breach can cover a wide range of circumstances from the
loss of a portable storage device with the details of a relatively few clients to
the unauthorised disclosure of information on a complete data system. Given
the structural imperative of continuous disclosure, it would seem that
notification under the regime would be focused towards the latter types of data
breach as the impact of such incidents could have a detrimental impact on the
regulation of fair and open markets. The ramifications of the TJX incident
have been enormous. A number of banks, credit card providers and US states
brought legal actions against TJX for losses suffered from the data breach.166
TJX opted to settle legal actions brought against them, and for instance, paid
Visa $US40.9 million compensation.167 The total estimated cost of the breach
is projected at $US4.5 billion including potential legal liabilities.168
Nevertheless, a data breach that involves a small amount of personal data
could still have a catastrophic effect on a corporation if, for example, it led to
a loss of life or the destruction of corporate reputation.
It is not surprising then that corporations have thus far been so reluctant to
report data breaches. This was borne out by the 2006 Computer Crime and
Security Report, conducted annually by the Federal Bureau of Investigations
(FBI). The report indicated that only 25% of the companies surveyed would
disclose details of an information security breach to law enforcement
agencies.169A total of 30% of those surveyed confirmed that that they did not
report the data breach at all even though 52% of those surveyed admitted that
an unauthorised use of their computer system had taken place.170 The primary
reason why organisations declined to inform law enforcement agencies was
the negative publicity that would be generated which had the potential to
166 See Re TJX Companies Retail Security Breach Litigation No 07-10162-WGY.
167 R Kerber, ‘TJX Reaches $40m settlement with Visa Over Data Breach’, Boston Globe,
Boston, 2007.
168 Berg, Freeman and Schneider, above n 156, at 34.
169 Computer Security Institute and Federal Bureau of Investigation, above n 3.
170 Ibid, p 10.
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damage stock prices and corporate reputations. A further 36% of respondents
also did not disclose details of a security breach because they believed that it
would give their competitors an advantage. Astonishingly, 22% of respondents
claimed to be unaware of law enforcement interest.171
The likely financial liabilities that will arise as a result of the breach are
consequently another important factor. Data which may have been disclosed
in an unauthorised manner would be subject to disclosure under data breach
notification statutes such as that proposed for Australia where there is a real
risk of serious harm to any affected individual.172 Under continuous
disclosure, the relevant risk is not that of the serious harm to the individual,
but rather the likely consequences of that harm upon the corporation. Thus, the
more likely and significant the financial consequences of the data breach
(liability under contract, tort law or statute),173 the more likely that knowledge
of the data breach which might give rise to such liability would necessitate
disclosure under the continuous disclosure regime. Accordingly, while there is
a link between the potential liability that will be incurred by a corporation and
the harm inflicted upon an individual that flows from a data breach of his or
hers personal information, the notification elements of both the continuous
disclosure regime and data breach notification laws provide different remedies
to alternatively perceived legal problems. The former directly corrects market
inequities with an ancillary effect of enhancing consumer knowledge whereas
the latter facilitates consumer protections in relation to the mitigation of
identity theft and tangentially seeks to enhance corporate information security
measures.
In turn, another factor regarding notification under the continuous
disclosure regime will be whether the data breach is likely to result in a loss
of confidence in the corporation’s data security systems. Even if the data
breach itself is not likely to result in direct financial loss to the corporations,
it is possible that the knowledge of a data breach will affect the corporation’s
business, as evidenced by the infamous ChoicePoint breach. ChoicePoint was
a data collection and storage company that held information on US households
and persons totalling 19 billion records on US citizens.174 ChoicePoint
provided access to its databases for legitimate businesses for a subscription
fee. At the time of the breach, ChoicePoint had 50,000 subscribing companies
that included insurance agencies, banks, landlords and private detectives.175 In
February 2005, criminals posing as a small business applied to ChoicePoint
for subscription to their information services. Once the criminals subscribed to
171 Ibid, p 22.
172 Ibid.
173 For a discussion of potential grounds for liability, see J Schneider, ‘Preventing Data
Breaches: Alternative Approaches to Deter Negligent Handling of Consumer Data’ (2009)
15 Boston University Jnl of Science & Technology Law 279 and Chandler, above n 151,
at 223.
174 See Electronic Privacy Information Center, Choicepoint, Electronic Privacy Information
Center, Washington DC, 2008, <http://epic.org/privacy/choicepoint/> (accessed 23 April
2010) regarding the role of ChoicePoint as a data broker.
175 See, eg, D A Bishop, ‘To Serve and Protect: Do Businesses Have a Legal Duty to Protect
Collections of Personal Information?’ (2006) 3 Shidler Jnl of Law, Communication &
Technology 1, regarding class actions against ChoicePoint; see also Bingisser, above n 22,
regarding the actions of state attorneys-general.
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ChoicePoint’s information services they were allowed to acquire the personal
information of 163,000 persons including date of birth, social security
numbers and credit reports to be used for identity theft crimes.
The application forms necessary to access ChoicePoint’s data were
completed using false information which the corporation failed to realise
because it had not implemented procedures that confirmed and authorised the
identities of potential subscribers.176 ChoicePoint later admitted that 50
business clients to whom it was selling data were fraudulent entities177
because it did not have processes in place to identify and monitor unlawful
users despite the fact that they had been previously notified by law
enforcement authorities of fraudulent activities arising from some of their
subscribers.178 ChoicePoint notified consumers of the incident pursuant to the
Californian law and were subsequently charged with offences relating to the
failure to provide adequate security and for making false and misleading
statements about its privacy policy. In total, 800 incidents of identity theft
have been attributed to the ChoicePoint data breach.179 ChoicePoint agreed to
pay $US10 million in civil penalties and $US5 million in consumer redress to
reimburse consumers for expenses due to identity theft.180 The effect on
ChoicePoint’s share price was dramatic and never recovered which led to the
sale of the corporation in 2008.181
Corporations which rely upon the confidence of the public in their handling
of personal data, such as ChoicePoint, would be expected to have
sophisticated data security systems. Depending upon the type and extent of the
data breach, the public’s confidence in the corporation might be affected
negatively by the knowledge that their data protection systems are ineffective
even if no financial loss transpires immediately. Consequently, the impact of
a data breach on future business prospects of a corporation may be adversely
affected by any public loss of confidence depending upon the extent of the
breach, its nature (systemic or isolated) and the business of the corporation.
Accordingly, the nature of a corporation’s business will be an important
consideration. For example, whether secure processes of data collection and
storage are essential to the corporation’s business or, at the other extreme, is
merely an insignificant aspect of that business. The discussion in the previous
paragraph alludes to the fact that the confidence of clients in personal
information security provided by a corporation is likely to be more or less
critical depending upon the nature of the business involved.182 One might
176 See P N Otto et al, The ChoicePoint Dilemma: How Data Brokers Should Handle the
Privacy of Personal Information, (2007) 5 IEEE Security & Privacy 15 at 18, providing a
detailed and critical overview of the incident.
177 See Garcia, above n 17, at 716.
178 United States of America v ChoicePoint Inc 06-CV-0198 (ND Ga 2006) (US) 13.
179 Federal Trade Commission, ChoicePoint Settles Data Security Breach Charges; to Pay $10
Million in Civil Penalties, $5 Million for Consumer Redress, Federal Trade Commission,
Washington DC, 2006, <http://www.ftc.gov/opa/2006/01/choicepoint.htm> (accessed
23 April 2010).
180 Ibid.
181 Electronic Privacy Information Center, above n 174.
182 See K Picanso, ‘Protecting Information Security under a Uniform Data Breach Notification
Law’ (2006) 75 Fordham L Rev 355 at n 35, citing G Keizer, ‘Report: Security Slip-Ups
Don’t Ding Stock Prices for Long’, TechWeb News, 23 September 2005, at
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imagine that the disclosure of the client base of a legitimate brothel might
have a more significant impact upon its future business than the actual
liabilities for unauthorised disclosure of information. Accordingly, the context
of personal information use and the nature of the organisation that collects
personal information will be a key point of concern and these concerns will
naturally vary on a case-by-case basis and thus produce different
consequences.
These various elements mentioned above will be relevant in determining
whether the knowledge of the actual data breach is, once revealed to the
public, likely to affect the corporation’s future business. These matters will
have a direct bearing upon whether investors would discount the price of
shares in the corporation as a result of the fact that a data breach has occurred.
United States’ studies provide evidence that the negative consequences that
arise for corporations from a data breach are not significant over the long-term
but can be for certain types of corporation that are more susceptible to
reputational damage arising from a breach of personal information. Campbell
et al183 in their 2003 study examined stock market reaction to newspaper
reports about information security breaches by publicly traded US companies
from the beginning of 1995 to the end of 2000. The authors found that
companies suffered a significant negative market reaction relating to security
breaches of unauthorised access to confidential information, such as customer
databases.
Three years later, Acquisti et al184 examined the direct impact that data
breaches of personal information have on the share price of companies. The
study was wider in depth because it examined ‘privacy incidents’ involving
the misuse of an individual’s personal information through illegal sales, usage
or lack of formal protection which result in bad security practices, insider or
hacker attacks and loss or theft of computer equipment. The authors found that
organisations that encountered a data breach suffered a significant, though
short, negative impact to their share price. The dip in share price tended to
trough after the first day of the data breach announcement and then gradually
regained again over time to the extent that the initial loss became statistically
insignificant. However, the authors did note that a smaller number of
companies seemed to suffer significantly greater negative results than others
and this may be due to the fact they are more visible and more damage is
therefore done to their reputation.185As a result the US evidence indicates that
significant reductions in share value can occur in some cases upon
<http://www.techweb.com/wire/security/171200329> discussing a research paper that noted
stock price decreases for companies, like Choicepoint and Cardsystems, whose core
business was affected by security breaches, but only temporary harm to the stock prices of
other businesses.
183 Campbell et al, above n 10, at 431.
184 Acquisti, Friedman and Telang, above n 10.
185 Ibid.
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notification186 but virtually no reduction in value subsequent to disclosure in
others.187
Ascertaining how investors collectively will react to such news (whether
the knowledge of the occurrence of a data breach will affect the share price)
is likely to be a complex issue.188 Because of the variable nature of both the
types of data breaches and businesses affected, it cannot be said with any
assurance that all data breaches will lead to a material loss of share value,
requiring continuous disclosure of the breach.189 Similar to the points raised
above regarding corporation awareness, whether a data breach would require
notification under the continuous disclosure obligations is consequently likely
to be a matter of context that will require a rigorous case-by-case
investigation. Nevertheless, we suggest that if a corporation’s business relates
to personal information then that corporation would be well advised to ensure
it has implemented adequate information security protections because it is
more likely than other types of corporations to be required to notify under the
continuous disclosure regime.
D Would the listing rule exceptions apply to a data
breach?
It is difficult to see how the Listing Rule exceptions can apply to a data breach.
For the first requirement, namely, that a reasonable person would not expect
the information to be disclosed because the result would be unreasonably
prejudicial to the entity, it is unlikely that the ASX would consider disclosure
of a data breach to be unreasonably prejudicial to the entity. Given that the
ASX must balance the needs of the market and the interests of the entity and
bearing in mind the principle on which the Listing Rule is based, which is a
fully informed market, it is more likely that the ASX will consider that a data
breach is information that should be disclosed.
For the second requirement that the information is confidential and the ASX
has not formed the view that confidentiality is lost, it is unlikely that a data
breach will fall within this category. We contend that a data breach would not
be classified as a type of information that would receive the confidentiality
status of Listing Rule 3.1A.2. For the third requirement, the only component
186 G E Christion, ‘A New Approach to Data Security Breaches’ (2009) 7 Canadian Jnl of Law
& Technology 149, reports at n 7: ChoicePoint, for example, at a particular point in time,
experienced more than a 20% decline in its stock price following its February 2005
disclosure of a serious security breach. See T J Smedinghoff, ‘The Challenge of Electronic
Data: Corporate Legal Obligations to Provide Information Security’ (2006) 10(3)Wall Street
Lawyer 1 at 6.
187 See R Sprague and C Ciocchetti, ‘Preserving Identities: Protecting Personal Identifying
Information through Enhanced Privacy Policies and Laws’ (2009) 19 Albany LJ of Science
& Technology 19, citing T Wailgum, ‘How TJX Avoided Wall Street’s Wrath’, CIO,
5 February 2008, at <http://www.cio.com/article/179603> (accessed 19 October 2010);
B Worthen, ‘TJX Earnings Suggest that Data Security Doesn’t Worry Consumers’, Wall
Street Journal, New York, 13 May 2008, at <http://blogs.wsj.com/biztech/2008/
05/13/tjx-earnings-suggest-that-data-secu rity-doesnt-worry-consumers/?mod =WSJBlog>
(accessed 19 October 2010).
188 See Picanso, above n 182, at 359.
189 See Campbell et al, above n 10, at 431–2 indicating that disclosure of private data does affect
share price.
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that would be likely to apply to a data breach is that ‘the information
comprises matters of supposition or is insufficiently definite to warrant
disclosure’ which would cover situations in which the corporation is not sure
whether it had actually suffered a data breach or not.
Overall, given the rationale behind the continuous disclosure requirements
which is to provide integrity in the Australian capital markets, and the fact that
studies have shown that data breaches do have an effect on the price of
securities traded on the ASX, we assert that it is unlikely that a data breach
will meet all three requirements of Listing Rule 3.1A. However, even if a
certain data breach incident did reach this requirement, the ASX could still
find that non-disclosure will create a false market, therefore requiring
disclosure of the incident from the corporation.
E Would knowledge of a data breach be information that
is not generally available?
We consider it unlikely that a data breach would qualify as being information
that is generally available in that it is difficult to see how the occurrence of a
data breach would be a situation that is likely to be readily observable or
brought to the attention of persons who commonly invest in those securities.
Using the four categories of data breaches outlined in Part V.B above, it would
be highly unlikely that a data breach in any of these four categories could
become information that is generally available. The discussion in Part V
demonstrates that some data breaches would be likely to fall under the
continuous disclosure obligations under the Corporations Act and the Listing
Rules but others may not. The determining factor boils down to the nature or
type of the breach which affects the second requirement, that of awareness.
However, given that it is possible for some data breaches to come within the
disclosure regime under the Corporations Act and Listing Rules, the next
question to consider is whether the Corporations Act and Listing Rules is an
appropriate avenue for the notification of data breaches. To answer this
question, the rationale behind the introduction of data breach notification laws
and the continuous disclosure laws must be examined and compared to
determine whether the rationale for data breach notification laws is compatible
within the continuous disclosure framework. This is discussed below.
VI Concluding remarks
At the commencement of this article, we stated the proposition that even
without a data breach notification statute it was possible that notification of
data breaches to the ASX may already be required under the continuous
disclosure regime. Consideration of the continuous disclosure obligations of
the Corporations Act and the Listing Rules undertaken above confirm that
many, if not most, data breaches occur while data is within the control of
entities listed on the Australian exchanges, are subject to disclosure to the
Exchange. This is of course dependent upon factors which might translate into
market consequences, such as extent of the breach and significance of the
security failure to the entity itself.
However, the rationale for disclosure under the continuous disclosure
regime is entirely different to that under a data breach notification law. Thus
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the different disclosure regimes exhibit different rationales and different
triggering events. Perhaps more importantly, the two require disclosure to
different parties and disclosure of different particulars.
The rationale behind the continuous disclosure requirements is to provide
integrity in the Australian capital markets and to ‘ensure that all participants
in the market for listed securities have equal access to all information which
is relevant to, or more accurately, likely to, influence decisions to buy or sell
those securities’.190As well, continuous disclosure discourages poor corporate
conduct.191 In contrast to the rationale of promoting efficient, fair and
transparent markets, data breach notification laws are intended both to
mitigate the damage to individuals whose data has been breached and to
encourage proper behaviour in relation to data security by requiring public
acknowledgement of security failures. While both regimes encourage proper
behaviour through disclosure requirements, this is where their similarities end.
Continuous disclosure deals with the aggregate real and potential financial
impact upon a listed entity as it is likely to be reflected in its securities. Where
required under the continuous disclosure obligations, disclosure of the
occurrence of a data breach is to be made to investors and market stakeholders
so that they, as investors, will be able to assess the accurate value of securities
in consequence of the data breach. Data breach notification laws, by contrast,
are not concerned with the significance of a data breach (or its aggregate
consequences) but rather with the consequences to each individual whose data
has been compromised. Thus, although notification may result in broader
market pressure (not merely reaction by the security markets) to correct data
security once the occurrence of a breach is known, an equally important
rationale of disclosure of data breaches is to protect each individual whose
information has been compromised irrespective of the aggregate effect of the
data breach. Although the ALRC stated in its 2007 Discussion Paper that data
breach notification can have a role in correcting market imperfections through
greater information disclosure about privacy breaches, we contend that the
conflicting purposes of continuing disclosure and data breach notification are
190 Jubilee Mines NL v Riley (2009) 253 ALR 673; 226 FLR 201; [2009] WASCA 62;
BC200901632 at [87]. See also ASX, ‘Continuous Disclosure: The Australian Experience’,
ASX, Sydney, 2002. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the debate surrounding
whether there is a need for a regime of mandatory disclosure and the theoretical
justifications for mandatory disclosure. For this, see E Raykovski, ‘Continuous Disclosure:
Has Regulation Enhanced the Australian Securities Market?’ (2004) 30(2) MonLR 269;
M Blair, ‘The Debate Over Mandatory Corporate Disclosure Rules’ (1992) 15(1) UNSWLJ
177; R I McEwin, ‘Australia’s Continuous Disclosure Regime: Some Comments’ (1992)
2(1) Aust Jnl of Corp Law 77; M Blair, ‘Australia’s Continuous Disclosure Regime:
Proposals for Change’ (1992) 2(1) Aust Jnl of Corp Law 54; A-M Neagle and N Tsykin,
‘“Please Explain”: ASX Share Price Queries and the Australian Continuous Disclosure
Regime’, University of Melbourne, Centre for Corporate Law and Securities Regulation
Research Paper, 2001.
191 As stated by Senator Bolkus in his Second Reading Speech introducing the Corporate Law
Reform Bill (No 2) 1992 into the Senate on 26 November 1992:
An effective disclosure system will often be a significant inhibition on questionable
corporate conduct. Knowledge that such conduct will be quickly exposed to the glare of
publicity, as well as criticism by shareholders and the financial press, makes it less likely
to occur in the first place. In essence, a well informed market leads to greater investor
confidence and in turn to a greater willingness to invest in Australian business.
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such that the former should not be used solely as a vehicle for implementing
the latter. Any market corrections that arise from data breach notification law
are therefore an ancillary consequence rather than an implementable and
measurable aim of the laws.
If a data breach does occur in Australia, entities listed on the ASX may have
an obligation to disclose the occurrence of such event under continuous
disclosure obligations, depending upon the significance of such data breach.
Unless a data breach notification statute is enacted, however, there is no
assurance that any individual will be informed that their particular information
has been compromised irrespective of the collective impact on the securities
market of the data breach. Clearly, there is a need for both types of disclosure.
The presence of one disclosure requirement will not be sufficient to achieve
the purposes of the both.
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